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Outsiders’ Perceptions and 
EU Influence in the World
The Case of Climate Change
Abstract
In recent years, a growing literature has focused on how the EU is perceived beyond 
its borders. One of the aims of these studies is to shed light on the ability of the EU 
to exercise external influence. This working paper argues, however, that outsiders’ 
perceptions of the EU are not necessarily a reliable guide to the EU’s external influence. 
It illustrates the argument by examining the case of climate change in which, despite 
broadly positive external perceptions, the EU has often failed in attempts to influence 
the positions of other states. Focusing on Chinese and Indian perceptions of the EU, the 
current paper argues that this apparent tension results from the fact that the EU on the 
one hand, and China and India on the other, have framed global climate governance 
in starkly contrasting ways. In particular, they have differed with respect to whether 
“climate leadership” by the EU should generate “followership” on the part of China and 
India. This paper uses the example of negotiations on a “second commitment period” 
under the Kyoto Protocol to demonstrate this point. It concludes by urging that greater 
attention be paid to the relationship between external perceptions and external influence.
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1. Introduction1
Since the early 1990s, EU policy makers have assumed a leading role with respect to 
international efforts to combat climate change. At the international level, the decision 
of European leaders in 2001 to proceed with ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in spite 
of the decision of the Bush administration in the United States to withdraw from the 
Protocol served to transfer the mantle of global leadership on environmental issues 
from the US to the EU, and the EU has sought to drive the process of international 
negotiations since that time (Vogler/Bretherton 2006). Internally, the EU has succeeded 
in developing progressively extensive climate legislation, including the flagship EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme and the 2009 Climate and Energy Package (Oberthür/
Pallemaerts 2010; Skjærseth/Wettestad 2007). Substantial research has been undertaken 
examining the contribution of the EU to global climate governance. Much of this 
research has concluded that the EU has exercised what we might call “leadership by 
example” (Gupta/Grubb 2000: 1; Oberthür/Roche Kelly 2008; Schreurs/Tiberghien 2007; 
Vogler 2005; Wurzel/Connelly 2010 ), though some scholars have taken a more critical 
view (Jordan et al. 2012; Parker/Karlsson 2010; Schunz 2012; Skodvin/Andresen 2006). 
What has been less evident in the discussion, however, is a sustained focus on whether 
EU leadership has caused others to follow, and how EU climate policy is perceived 
beyond its borders. In response, recent years have seen the emergence of new research 
on outsiders’ perceptions of the EU which has sought to examine the extent to which 
the EU’s perception of itself matches others’ perceptions (Chaban et al. 2013; Chaban et 
al. 2006; Elgström 2007; Holland 2007; Lucarelli 2007; Lucarelli/Fioramonti 2010a). 
The growing literature on external perceptions of the EU represents an important 
addition to our knowledge of the role of the EU in world politics. However, it presents 
some puzzling conclusions concerning the role of the EU as an environmental actor. 
A number of studies report that the EU is viewed positively with respect to climate 
and environmental issues by third parties (Chan 2010; Jain/Pandey 2010; Karlsson et 
al. 2011; Kilian/Elgström 2010; Lucarelli 2007; Vergeron 2007; Zhang 2011). However, 
if we look at the role the EU has played in global climate governance, we see a much 
more ambiguous pattern, particularly in recent years. The EU’s marginalisation at 
the Copenhagen climate change summit in 2009 was a particular low-point for EU 
climate diplomacy, but even over a longer time trajectory the EU’s ability to shape the 
international process has been limited, notwithstanding the notable success of securing 
entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol (Schunz 2012). 
This working paper takes that puzzle as a point of departure. It explores the relationship 
1  This working paper was written with financial and institutional support from the Kolleg-Forschergruppe 
(KFG) “The Transformative Power of Europe” at the Freie Universität Berlin. The author is particularly 
grateful to Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, and also to May-Britt Stumbaum, Garima Mohan, and Olivia 
Gippner of the NFG Research Group. Earlier versions of the paper were presented at the KFG annual 
conference in Berlin in December 2011 and the “EU in International Affairs” conference in Brussels in 
May 2012. The author wishes to thank the participants of both conferences, in particular Claire Dupont, for 
helpful feedback, as well as two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments.
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between external perceptions and external influence more closely, and seeks to challenge the 
assumption—both implicit and explicit in the literature—that external perceptions provide a 
useful guide to assessing the influence of the EU beyond its borders (Chaban et al. 2006: 248; 
Lucarelli/Fioramonti 2010b: 2). 
The current study uses the case of Chinese and Indian perceptions of the EU to make the 
argument that positive perceptions of the EU in a particular field do not necessarily tell us 
very much about the potential impact of the EU in that area. In particular, I argue that China 
and India, in concert with other developing countries, have been able to use the concept of 
EU “climate leadership” as a rhetorical strategy to resist the attempt by the EU to alter the 
balance of rights and responsibilities between developed and developing countries within the 
climate change regime. Using the example of negotiations on a second commitment period 
under the Kyoto Protocol, I show how China and India, in concert with other developing 
countries, framed this debate in terms of developed country leadership, and framed the 
EU’s negotiating position as an attempt to “kill” the Kyoto Protocol and as an abandonment 
of leadership, and that this contributed to a partial reversal of the EU’s negotiating position 
during 2010.
Further, the study focuses on the roles of China and India vis-à-vis the EU because these 
countries are those arguably under the most pressure from developed countries in the 
climate change negotiations to accept binding emissions targets under a future regime. 
China and India are not, of course, fully representative of the universe of EU partner countries 
since they are both materially and normatively powerful states in world politics and are, to 
some extent, leaders in their own right in global climate politics. Accordingly, this paper 
does not seek to draw sweeping conclusions from this single case. Rather, its contribution 
is to argue for caution when attempting to extrapolate patterns of EU influence based on 
outsiders’ perceptions. It also does not try to claim that there is no value in studying external 
perceptions. Instead, it seeks to highlight both the usefulness and also the limitations of this 
literature.
The paper consists of three main parts. The next section discusses the relationship between 
external perceptions and external influence and challenges the assumed link between how 
the EU is perceived by others and its ability to influence others. Section 3 reviews the findings 
of recent empirical literature on external perceptions of the EU, particularly as it relates to 
the area of (global) environmental policy, and unpacks the concept of “leadership” in the 
international climate regime to show how it is conceptualized differently by the EU on the 
one hand, and by China and India on the other. Building on this, Section 4 illustrates the 
argument by analyzing the negotiations on a second commitment period under the Kyoto 
Protocol.
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2.	 Outsiders’	Perceptions	and	EU	Influence
Because of the EU’s unique status as something less than a state but more than a classic 
international organisation, significant effort has been expended on trying to characterize 
the nature of the EU as a global actor. In the words of Jupile & Caporaso, the EU is 
“an evolving entity, composed of numerous issue areas and policy networks, neither a 
full-blown polity nor a system of sovereign states, which displays varying degrees of 
‘actorhood’ across issues and time” (Jupille/Caporaso 1998: 214). Attempts to capture 
the essential features of the EU as a global actor have made much of its distinctiveness, 
with scholars arguing variously that the EU is a “civilian power”, a “normative power”, 
an “ethical power”, or a “model power” (Aggestam 2008; Diez/Manners 2007; Duchêne 
1972; Laïdi 2008; Manners 2002; Orbie 2008; Telò 2006; and Telò 2009). However, by 
seeking to extrapolate from the internal institutional and ideational characteristics of 
the EU some sort of external identity, this long-running scholarly debate has served to 
focus attention inwards on what the EU is, rather than on what the EU does (Aggestam 
2008). Moreover, for a long time the debate neglected to examine what outsiders think 
about what the EU is and what it does. 
In response, a recent succession of literature has emerged focusing on external perceptions 
of the EU, both in general and with respect to climate change and environmental policy.2 
This literature has sought to shed light on a number of aspects of the EU’s external 
relations, including assessing the degree to which the EU’s supposed distinctiveness as 
a global actor is reflected in others’ perceptions, and how external perceptions of the 
EU contribute to the process of European identity formation (Lucarelli 2007; Lucarelli/
Fioramonti 2010b). However, most relevant in the current context is the contention that 
examining others’ perceptions of the EU can help us to assess the impact of the EU 
beyond its borders. Chaban, Elgström, and Holland argue that “outsiders’ expectations 
and perceptions influence the impact of EU foreign policy role performance. Whether 
policy initiatives taken by the EU reach their goals, and whether (and to what extent) 
the Union may play a leadership role in a given policy area, are partly determined by 
the images others have of the EU” (Chaban et al. 2006: 248). Similarly, Lucarelli and 
Fioramonti argue that “the way in which the EU is perceived by other countries is likely 
to have a direct bearing on its success as a player in the international arena. What the 
world thinks of the EU is therefore an important factor in facilitating or opposing the 
achievements of EU-sponsored policies” (Lucarelli/Fioramonti 2010b: 2).
However, the usefulness of external perceptions for assessing the influence of the EU is 
likely to be limited by three related factors. First, some of the data simply are not very 
relevant to the question of EU external influence, particularly those that draw on public 
opinion surveys and media analysis, though several of the relevant studies focus partly 
or wholly on elite perceptions (Holland 2007; Lucarelli/Fioramonti 2010a). 
2  This literature results from a number of research projects: “The External Image of the European 
Union”, led by Sonia Lucarelli in the framework of the GARNET network; “External Perceptions of the 
EU” led by Martin Holland and Natalia Chaban at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand; there 
are also more specific projects such as an EU FP7 project on “Chinese Views of the EU”, led by Wang 
Zhengxu, coordinated by the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham and involving 
a consortium of six institutions in the EU and China; as well as the NFG Research Group “Asian 
Perceptions of the EU”.
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There is only a relatively indirect causal connection between public opinion and media 
framings of the EU in third countries and EU influence in those countries. However, 
secondly, even the results of elite surveys can be problematic, because favourable 
external perceptions of the EU in a particular domain are likely to be only one of a range 
of factors affecting EU influence. It is reasonable to expect that negative perceptions of 
the EU by outsiders will inhibit EU influence, or at least raise the costs of effective EU 
action. However, favourable external perceptions are unlikely to do anything more than 
act as a facilitator for EU external influence, and a range of other factors are likely to be 
important in determining the nature and extent of EU influence. Third, in the specific 
case of perceptions of EU “leadership”, these are not bound to generate “followership” 
if other actors do not believe that the behaviour of the EU is appropriate to their own 
circumstances. Instead, it is important to take into account the particular characteristics 
of the issue in question and the ways in which the respective roles of “leader” and 
“follower” are conceptualised by each side. Therefore, while the growing trend towards 
examining external perceptions of the EU represents a welcome attempt to “de-centre” 
the study of EU external relations, it is of limited help in understanding the nature and 
extent of EU influence. This is particularly true when we look at the question of EU 
leadership in the area of global environmental politics. Focusing on external perceptions 
of the EU as a “leader” tells us little about the relational aspect of leadership, that is, the 
relationship between leader and follower. While much of the conceptual literature on 
leadership emphasizes its relational nature (see, for example, Malnes 1995; Underdal 
1991; Young 1991), much of the empirical work which attempts to apply these concepts to 
the EU’s contribution to global environmental politics neglects this relational dimension 
(Oberthür/Roche Kelly 2008; Schreurs/Tiberghien 2007; Vogler 2005). In order to make 
the findings of the literature on external perceptions more meaningful, it is necessary to 
understand them in the context of the EU’s relations with specific countries in defined 
issue areas. The rest of this working paper attempts to do so by considering the case of 
Chinese and Indian perceptions of the EU on climate change.
3. The Paradox of External Perceptions of the EU as an Environmental Actor
To the extent that the literature on external perceptions of the EU has focused on the 
EU as an environmental actor, it has generally found that the EU is perceived in positive 
terms. Lucarelli reports that the image of the EU as an environmental leader is growing 
rapidly, particularly as a reaction to the EU’s activism regarding the Kyoto Protocol. 
These findings “point to a rapidly growing expectation of a leading role for the EU in 
the protection of the global environment, in particular how to tackle global warming” 
(Lucarelli 2007: 264). 
A small number of studies have focused more specifically on perceptions of leadership 
in the climate change regime, and in particular on perceptions of EU leadership. One 
earlier study by Gupta and van der Grijp, using 67 interviews with climate change 
negotiators in 1997–98, found that there were no “clear-cut” or “confident” leaders in 
the negotiators, but that a number of countries played limited leadership roles (Gupta/
van der Grijp 1999). 
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The EU was viewed as playing a limited leadership role in terms of agenda-setting, norm 
development, adoption of the initiative, and pushing for stringent targets for greenhouse 
gas reduction or limitation, though the EU was also perceived to be a hypocritical leader 
for a number of reasons (Gupta/van der Grijp 1999: 313-316).3
More recently, two studies have focused on perceptions of leadership among negotiators 
at the 14th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate 
Change (COP-14) in Poznan, Poland in 2008. Karlsson et al. report, on the basis of 
a survey of 233 representatives of government, NGOs, business, the United Nations, 
and the media, that “the European Union is the actor most commonly viewed as a 
leader on climate change as 62 percent of all respondents identify the EU as having 
a leading role in the climate change negotiations” (Karlsson et al. 2011: 96). However, 
there is no clear single leader on climate change: only 14 percent viewed the EU as the 
only leader. They also found that the EU is perceived as a leader particularly among 
respondents from Asia, Europe, North America, and Oceania.4 In another study, Kilian 
and Elgström conducted interviews with both EU and non-EU participants at COP-14 
to test more specifically for perceptions of the EU as fulfilling a leadership role (Kilian/
Elgström 2010).5 They found that the EU is viewed, for the most part, as a coherent 
and credible actor from the outside and has a significant impact on the negotiations, 
and that “[t]here is unanimous agreement among third state representatives that the 
Union is still a leader in climate change, no matter whether the interviewee represents 
a developing or a developed country”. Moreover, they found that this view was affirmed 
by representatives of the United States, China, and Japan (Kilian/Elgström 2010: 262).
A number of studies looking more specifically at Chinese perceptions of the EU have 
come to a similar conclusion. Vergeron reported that “the Chinese recognize that 
Europe has been ‘the champion and leader at the international level in combating 
climate change and pollution’” (Vergeron 2007: 23), while Chan reports similarly that 
“the EU serves as a model for China in terms of its economic, social and environmental 
policies, areas in which the EU is seen as being a global leader and role model” (Chan 
2010: 140). A project led by the University of Nottingham on “Chinese Views of the EU” 
recently reported very positive perceptions of the EU’s role in environmental protection 
among a number of categories of Chinese elites. These ranged from a low of 71.6 percent 
positive perceptions among business representatives, to a high of 85.2 percent positive 
perceptions among government officials. Negative perceptions among elites ranged 
from 1 percent of government officials to 5.2 percent of “intellectuals” (Zhang 2011: 5). 
Moreover, the environment was generally not ranked as one of the most controversial 
issues in the EU-China relationship by Chinese elites, and was identified as an area 
where cooperation should be strengthened (Zhang 2011: 6).
3  These included that the EU’s emissions reductions were seen to be the result of “good luck” rather 
than specifically climate change policies, and the EU had no sense of how the targets it was proposing 
would be achieved.
4  Interestingly, they also found that China was perceived by many as playing a leading role, particularly 
among respondents from Africa and Latin America.
5  This study was, however, based on a small sample of participants—11 non-EU and 4 EU. For a longer 
presentation of the findings of this research project, see Kilian (2009).
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While Indian perceptions have tended to be more mixed, Jain and Pandey nonetheless 
report that “[t]he European Union was considered a normative power primarily because 
of its role in global climate negotiations and trade talks and described by some ‘elites’ 
as a major player in terms of agenda setting and regulating the norms of international 
behaviour” (Jain/Pandey 2010: 204). While this does not necessarily indicate a positive 
view, they go on to state that while some Indian elites viewed the EU in negative terms 
in this regard, some viewed the EU as a leader in international politics.
Although the literature on external perceptions of the EU as an environmental actor 
paints a somewhat mixed picture, the prevailing view reported across a number 
of projects is of the EU as a credible environmental actor and, to some extent, as a 
“leader” with respect to climate change policy. These findings seem somewhat puzzling, 
given the widespread perception that the EU has often failed to achieve many of its 
desired outcomes in the negotiations on a future climate change regime. As discussed 
above, this is due to the fact that external perceptions are not necessarily very helpful 
in assessing the EU’s external influence. In the case of the EU’s purported international 
leadership role on climate change, a key point is that the global governance of climate 
change, and the rights and responsibilities of different states therein, has been framed 
in very different ways by the EU on the one hand, and by China and India on the other.
3.1  The European Conception of Global Climate Governance
The EU has conceptualised climate governance as an arena in which industrialised 
countries should “take the lead” in setting ambitious action for greenhouse gas reduction 
and implementing policies to achieve those targets, though historically the EU has been 
somewhat better at the first of these than the second.6 However, this is done in the 
expectation that others would follow the EU’s example, not least because of the fact that 
even reducing EU emissions to zero would not, in the absence of action by the rest of 
the world, have any significant effect on mitigating climate change. For this reason, a 
core element of the EU conception of “leadership” on climate change is the expectation 
that other states would follow, though precisely which types of states should follow, and 
when, has varied over time. Since the earliest years of the climate negotiations, the EU 
has been engaged in an ongoing attempt to secure the meaningful participation of the 
United States in the climate change regime, with varying degrees of success. 
With respect to the participation of developing countries, particularly those with relatively 
higher levels of aggregate emissions such as China and India, the position of the EU 
has always been that such countries should eventually be required to adopt binding 
emission limitation or reduction commitments, but should not initially be required 
to do so. In this respect, the EU position has stood in contrast to that of the United 
States, which has tended to demand “meaningful” participation of these countries over 
a shorter timeframe. 
6  For a recent critical analysis of EU leadership in the climate change regime which discusses the gap 
between EU rhetoric and action, see Parker/Karlsson (2010).
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The EU sought to bring up the question of developing country participation under a 
future climate change regime on a number of occasions in the international negotiations, 
including in 1994 and 2002, but this was always strongly resisted by China, India, and 
other developing countries. 
However, from 2005 onwards the EU became increasingly concerned with the growth 
of emissions from large developing countries.7 A communication from the European 
Commission in January 2005, which was endorsed by the March 2005 European Council 
meeting, flagged “broadening international participation”, including that of large 
developing countries, as a key EU goal for the forthcoming negotiations on a post-2012 
climate regime (European Commission 2005). As climate change moved towards the 
top of the European policy agenda over subsequent years, the March 2007 European 
Council meeting set out the EU’s headline target for emission reduction for the period 
to 2020, as part of its contribution to the process of building a post-2012 regime. This 
consisted of an unconditional commitment by 2020 to reduce emissions by 20 percent 
relative to 1990 levels which would be raised to 30 percent in the context of a global 
agreement in which “other developed countries commit themselves to comparable 
emission reductions and economically more advanced developing countries to 
contributing adequately according to their responsibilities and respective capabilities” 
(European Council 2001: 12, emphasis added). 
On the specific issue of developing countries’ emissions, the European Council 
highlighted the increasing share of global emissions from developing countries, and 
“the need for these countries to address the increase in these emissions by reducing the 
emission intensity of their economic development, in line with the general principle 
of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (European 
Council 2007: 13). At this stage, the EU did not specify what it would consider an 
“adequate” contribution by economically more advanced developing countries, but it 
was clear already that the EU expected countries such as China and India to follow the 
lead of the EU in the development of a post-2012 climate regime. 
3.2 Chinese and Indian Conceptions of Global Climate Governance
China and India have, in contrast, conceptualized leadership on the issue of climate 
change differently to the EU, placing a strong emphasis on the responsibility of 
developed countries for the historical accumulation of greenhouse gas emissions in 
the atmosphere,8 and the generally higher levels of per capita emissions in developed 
7  China overtook the United States as the world’s largest emitter in 2006, and the International Energy 
Agency has projected that, if governments maintain current policies, 56 percent of the total increase 
in global emissions from 2005 to 2030 will be accounted for by China and India (International Energy 
Agency (2007); and Vidal/Adam (2007)).
8  The United States alone accounts for 29.3 percent of cumulative global emissions over the period of 
1850–2002, while the then EU25 account for 26.5 percent. Russia, Canada, Japan and Australia together 
account for a further 15.4 percent (Baumert et al. (2005: 32)).
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countries relative to developing countries.9 Focusing on the developed world’s generally 
high levels of past emissions and current emissions per capita, China, India, and other 
developing countries have understood EU “leadership” (and that of other developed 
countries) as the fulfilment of a moral responsibility that requires developed countries to 
take the lead in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Accordingly, this form of leadership 
entails little “followership” on the part of developing countries, at least in the short 
to medium term. Indeed, Gupta argues that developing countries signed and ratified 
the UNFCCC “because of the initial understanding that the climate change problem 
called for a restructuring of production and consumption processes, and because of the 
assumption that the ICs [industrial countries] would take serious measures to reduce 
their own emissions” (Gupta 1998: 182). In this regard, China and India emphasize a 
strict adherence to the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities” (CBDR) embodied in the text of the UNFCCC.10 The first principle 
of the UNFCCC states:
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, 
the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change 
and the adverse effects thereof (Article 3.1, UNFCCC, emphasis added).
This is the foundation of both China’s and India’s conceptualization of EU leadership 
on climate change, and it is a principal which both countries have defended strongly 
in the UNFCCC negotiations. On this basis, they have argued that they should not be 
subject to binding limitations on their emissions levels in the short term. China and 
India have also historically defended the existing binary distinction between developed 
(Annex I) and developing (non-Annex I) countries enshrined in the UNFCCC and 
Kyoto Protocol, for the obvious reason that they would be considered by many to be 
the first candidates for “evolution” to Annex I status. While India has been somewhat 
more vigorous and vocal than China in defending a strict interpretation of the CBDR 
principle and the special rights of developing countries in the climate regime, there 
are very significant commonalities between their respective negotiating positions. This 
position was softened somewhat at the most recent UN climate conference in Durban in 
November–December 2011, at which all Parties agreed to commence negotiations on a 
future international agreement to contain commitments for all major emitters, including 
developing countries. While this represents a significant departure in principle from 
China’s and India’s historical opposition to binding targets for developing countries, 
what was agreed in Durban represents only an agreement to commence negotiations, 
and it remains to be seen what kind of commitments they are willing to accept under a 
future agreement. Moreover, equity and historical responsibility remain cornerstones of 
the negotiating positions of both countries.
9  Per capita emissions for 2005 were 23.4 metric tons CO2e per person in the United States, 10.3 
metric tons in the EU27, while the figures for China and India were 5.5 and 1.7 metric tons, respectively. 
However, some oil-producing developing countries have the highest per-capita emission levels in the 
world. Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Bahrain were four of the top five emitting countries on 
a per-capita basis in 2005 (World Resources Institute (2010)).
10  The most comprehensive academic treatment of differentiation in international environmental law 
is Rajamani (2006). See also Okereke (2008) and Stone (2004).
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In short, China and India on the one hand, and the EU on the other, have conceptualized 
global climate governance in strikingly different ways, with significant implications 
for whether and how China and India should respond to the EU’s purported climate 
leadership. Thus, there is no necessary contradiction in the fact that while the EU is 
perceived as a “leader”, it is unable to induce China and India to follow. This analysis 
of competing conceptions of climate governance provides a plausible explanation for 
the apparent puzzle of limited EU influence despite positive external perceptions as 
an environmental actor. In order to strengthen the argument further, the next section 
delves into more detail to show how, in a specific instance of UN climate negotiations, 
China and India in concert with other developing countries were able to use European 
claims to climate leadership as a means to constrain the EU negotiating position.
4. Post-2012 Negotiations and the Future of the Kyoto Protocol
The negotiations around a post-2012 climate change regime, in particular the issue of 
the future of the Kyoto Protocol, provide a telling example of how the EU, China, and 
India have differed with respect to global climate governance and their conceptualization 
of the EU role therein. Not only have they differed, in fact, but China and India together 
with other developing countries have succeeded in framing the debate over the future of 
the Kyoto Protocol in terms of the EU’s need to demonstrate leadership and, in doing so, 
have constrained the negotiating position of the EU. This section does not seek to claim 
that this aspect is the only or even necessarily the most important aspect of the ongoing 
negotiations, but it is an issue which has generated much publicity and tension.
Substantive negotiations for a global agreement on climate change for the period 
beyond 2012 were launched at COP-13 in Bali in December 2007.11 COP-13 launched 
a negotiating process on a climate regime for the post-2012 period which was aimed 
at reaching agreement by the COP-15 in Copenhagen in December 2009. This process 
consisted of two parallel tracks of negotiation. The first of these was the “Ad Hoc 
Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol” 
(AWG-KP), which was tasked with establishing targets under a second commitment 
period of the Kyoto Protocol for so-called “Annex I” countries, the group of countries 
with quantified emission targets under the Kyoto Protocol (i.e., developed countries 
excluding the United States). The second negotiating track was the “Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action” (AWG-LCA). This was tasked with considering 
future action by all parties, including the United States and developing countries. The 
mandate for the AWG-LCA, set out in the “Bali Action Plan” (BAP), identified four areas 
for negotiation: (i) mitigation; (ii) adaptation; (iii) technology; and (iv) finance (UNFCCC 
2008). On the issue of mitigation—the focus of this section—the twin-track negotiating 
process distinguished between the mitigation activities to be negotiated for developed 
countries, described as “nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or action, 
11  The relevance of the year 2012 lies in the fact that the “first commitment period” of the Kyoto 
Protocol, the only period during which any countries have quantified emissions reduction or limitation 
targets under the climate period, runs from 2008 to 2012, thus requiring a follow-up agreement for the 
period beyond 2012.
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including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives”, and the mitigation 
activities to be negotiated for developing countries, described as “nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions” (not commitments).12
What the precise institutional and legal relationship between these two negotiating 
tracks would be, and particularly how these two tracks were to be combined in a 
final agreement, was never made clear and was a cause of significant conflict as the 
negotiations proceeded. China and India in particular were very keen to maintain the 
binary distinction between Annex I (developed) and non-Annex I (developing) countries 
institutionalized in the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, for the obvious reason that 
they would be among the first developing countries to be proposed for “graduation” 
to Annex I status. For this reason, they sought to maintain the distinction between 
the AWG-LCA and AWG-KP negotiating tracks, and to push for a second commitment 
period under the Kyoto Protocol.
The EU, while acknowledging that developing countries should not be required to take 
the same actions as developed countries, nonetheless placed increasing emphasis on 
the need for developing countries with large aggregate emissions to adopt measures 
to limit their emissions within the framework of a post-2012 climate change regime. 
In October 2008, the Environment Council adopted the position that “[d]eveloping 
countries as a group, in particular the most advanced among them, would have to 
reduce their emissions by 15 to 30 % below business as usual, respecting the principle 
of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”.13 While the 
precise legal character of the respective commitments of developed and developing 
countries was not specified, the EU advocated a legally binding global agreement that 
would include commitments for all “major emitters”. 
In what would prove a highly controversial move, the EU adopted the position that 
rather than having two parallel agreements—a continuation of the Kyoto Protocol with 
a second commitment period, and a separate agreement under the AWG-LCA track 
binding all other so-called “major emitters”—it would be preferable to have a “single 
legal instrument”. This would be an agreement incorporating the “essential elements” 
of the Kyoto Protocol—though what these elements were was not specified in detail—
and would be legally and institutionally more straightforward, making the process of 
national ratification simpler. This preference was first articulated by EU negotiators 
at the Bangkok UNFCCC meeting in September–October 2009, two months before 
Copenhagen (Council of the European Union 2009c). During that negotiating session, EU 
negotiators sought to highlight that they wished to incorporate the successful elements 
of the Kyoto Protocol into a new global agreement, that they remained committed to 
the Protocol, and that the proposed arrangement did not mean that the Kyoto Protocol 
“will have to die” (IISD 2009).
12  Furthermore, during the final plenary in Bali, India, supported by the G77, succeeded in adding 
text to the effect that developing countries’ actions must be “supported and enabled by technology, 
financing and capacity-building [provided by developed countries], in a measurable, reportable and 
verifiable manner”.
13  Alongside this, the EU proposed that industrialized countries should reduce their emissions by 25–
40 percent below 1990 levels by 2020, and by 80–95 percent by the 2050 Council of the European Union 
(2008: 6).
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The response from developing countries was swift and sharp. The EU preference for a 
single legal instrument was framed by developing countries as an attempt to destroy 
the Kyoto Protocol and the CBDR principle, therefore implying an abandonment of 
leadership by the EU. During a plenary session in Bangkok, China expressed “deep 
concerns” about this development, and accused some parties of trying to “undermine, 
challenge, and destroy the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, 
that is the foundation for international cooperation on climate change” (Third World 
Network 2009c). Speaking to the media in Bangkok, the head of the Chinese delegation, 
Yu Qingtai, stated:
Everybody agreed in Bali that there should be a twin-track system and one 
of the tracks should be a discussion of the second commitment period. But 
now people are trying to take away the wheels on this track ... At the same 
time they are working to terminate the Kyoto Protocol before the second 
commitment period gets under way (Euractiv 2009b).
India took a similar position. At the closing plenary of the AWG-KP in Bangkok, the 
Indian negotiator described the position of developed countries in the following terms:
We see now clearly that the intention is to terminate the KP, a move that we 
have to caution would put the Bali Action Plan in jeopardy and exposes their 
lack of intention to solve climate change (Third World Network 2009b).
By repeatedly referring to the Bali Action Plan, the principles of the UNFCCC, and 
in particular the CBDR principle, China and India sought to tie the issue of a second 
commitment period rhetorically to the EU’s leadership role, and to imply that the EU 
was trying to “kill” the Kyoto Protocol and was therefore abandoning that role. They did 
not act alone: many other developing countries made similar statements, and Sudan, 
representing the G77 and China at the time, stressed that calls for an end to the Kyoto 
Protocol were “completely unacceptable” to the G-77 and China, noting that under the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol “we have all agreed that Annex I Parties must ‘take the 
lead’ in meeting their obligations to mitigate GHG emissions” (IISD 2009). 
While all of these comments were directed at developed countries in general, it is clear 
that at this time they were directed in particular at the EU, since the EU’s announcement 
of its preference for a single legal instrument became one of the main flashpoints of the 
Bangkok negotiating session, and also because the EU had played the role of “saving” 
the Kyoto Protocol following its rejection by the United States in 2001.
In the lead-up to and during the Copenhagen conference, the EU maintained its 
negotiating position regarding the legal form of the proposed agreement.14 At the often 
chaotic Copenhagen conference, the future of the Kyoto Protocol remained a major 
point of contention. At a stocktaking plenary at the mid-point of the conference, the 
Swedish EU Presidency complained that “[t]he texts are not balanced when it comes to 
the requirements on different developed countries and sets out only a loose framework 
for the actions by developing countries. 
14  The October 2009 meeting of the Environment Council, which set out in detail the EU negotiating 
position for Copenhagen, reaffirmed this position clearly. See Council of the European Union (2009a: 
23).
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On the one side there is a continued Kyoto Protocol and on the other side there are no 
legally binding requirements at all” (Council of the European Union 2009b). Speaking 
at the high-level segment of the conference a few days later, Swedish Environment 
Minister Andreas Carlgren on behalf of the EU reiterated the EU position:
We fought hard to rescue the Kyoto protocol. We will do much better than 
our Kyoto target. We want an agreement building on all essentials of the 
Kyoto protocol. However, the Protocol alone cover [sic] less than a third of 
global emissions and will not be enough to win the battle against climate 
change. We must strive for an agreement that is comprehensive, more 
ambitious, with broader participation and legally binding for all (Government 
of Sweden 2009).
Particularly noteworthy about this statement is the fact that Carlgren felt the need to 
justify the EU position by referencing the EU’s role in saving the Kyoto Protocol, thereby 
seeking to defend the EU’s leadership record in these terms. 
Developing countries, meanwhile, maintained their strong opposition to the position of 
the EU and other developed countries. Early in the second week of the conference, the 
Africa Group, supported by China, India, and many other developing countries, refused 
to participate in other areas of the negotiations unless they were assured that there would 
be a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. Negotiations resumed after 
the Danish head of the conference gave assurances that the Kyoto Protocol negotiations 
would be given priority in the sequencing of negotiations (Third World Network 
2009a). Jairam Ramesh, Indian Minister for Environment and Forests, expressed similar 
concerns, arguing that many developed countries were “vehemently opposing” the 
Protocol: “The sense we get is that [the] Kyoto [Protocol] is in intensive care if not dead,” 
Ramesh told reporters (Euractiv 2009a). The Kyoto Protocol did not die in Copenhagen: 
both negotiating tracks were extended beyond the Copenhagen deadline, though there 
was no substantive agreement from either track, and the conference “took note” of 
“Copenhagen Accord”, the three-page agreement negotiated by heads of state in the 
final days of the conference, rather than formally adopting it (UNFCCC 2010).
In the months following Copenhagen, high-level representatives of both China and India 
continued to frame the EU’s negotiating position as an abandonment of leadership, and 
reiterated their expectation that the EU would agree to a second commitment period. 
Following a meeting with Commissioner for Climate Action Connie Hedegaard in 
Brussels in March 2010, China’s lead negotiator for climate change Su Wei stated: “The 
EU wants to maintain a leading role and it should maintain it ... But it should do so 
under the Bali roadmap”, a clear reference to the need for a second commitment period 
(Euractiv 2010b). The Indian ambassador to the EU made a similar case in an interview 
with the Euractiv website in February 2010:
For India, and other developing countries, the Kyoto Protocol represents an 
international commitment on the part of developed countries to fulfill their 
historical responsibility ... Casually setting aside the Kyoto Protocol or replacing 
it with another instrument would not only lend credence to the suspicion that the 
developed countries wish to get away from their legally-binding commitments, it 
would also put a question mark on the credibility of any new legal obligation they 
might take under a new instrument (Euractiv 2010a).
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While the EU stuck resolutely to its position regarding the legal form of a post-2012 
agreement during the Copenhagen conference, the reflection period that followed the 
conference in the first half of 2010 saw a change in the EU’s position. This was led by the 
UK, which proposed at the end of March 2010 that the EU should be prepared to agree 
to a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, provided that there would 
be a separate legal treaty covering all other countries (Vidal 2010). On this issue, the 
Commission’s communication that was launched earlier in March entitled International 
Climate Policy Post-Copenhagen stated only that “[t]he Commission will assess the 
merits and drawbacks of alternative legal forms, including of a second commitment 
period under the Kyoto Protocol” (European Commission 2010: 6). However, a month 
later Commissioner for Climate Action, Connie Hedegaard, indicated a change in the EU 
position in line with the UK proposal, namely that the EU would be willing to agree to a 
second commitment period (Euractiv 2010c). It is significant that Hedegaard announced 
this change in position during a meeting with Indian Minister for Environment and 
Forests, Jairam Ramesh, in Delhi on 9 April 2010 (European External Action Service 
2010). 
In the following months, the EU negotiating position on a second commitment period 
was clarified and made more explicit. As expressed at the August 2010 session of the 
UNFCCC negotiations in Bonn and confirmed by the October meeting of the Environment 
Council, the EU preference is now for a single legal instrument incorporating the 
essential elements of the Kyoto Protocol, but the EU is willing “to consider a second 
commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol, as part of a wider outcome including the 
perspective of the global and comprehensive framework engaging all major economies” 
(Council of the European Union 2010). This has remained the essential core of the EU 
negotiating position, and represents a significant symbolic reversal of the EU’s 2009 
negotiating position. 
At the UN climate change conference in Durban in November–December 2011, the EU 
agreed formally to a second commitment period. Of course, this was part of a broader 
deal, the other major element of which was the launching of negotiations within the 
framework of a new “Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action”. These negotiations were tasked with establishing “a protocol, another legal 
instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to 
all Parties” (Decision 1/CP.1, in UNFCCC 2012). This represents a significant change 
in the longstanding principled objection of China, India, and other large developing 
countries to binding commitments for developing countries. However, the Durban 
outcome represents only a commencement of negotiations, and it will be several years 
before we know what kinds of commitments China and India are willing to accept, and 
under what conditions: negotiations are scheduled to be concluded by 2015, with the 
future agreement to enter into force by 2020. Meanwhile, the EU agreement to be 
bound by commitments under a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol will 
apply from the beginning of 2013. 
The manner in which China, India, and other developing countries framed the 
negotiations on a second commitment period and the rhetorical pressure they exerted 
played a role in changing the EU’s position. There is no clear alternative explanation for 
the EU’s change of course. Indeed, other industrialised countries were moving in the 
opposite direction. 
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In December 2011, the Canadian government announced that it would withdraw from 
Kyoto, and at COP 18 in December 2012, Japan, New Zealand and the Russian Federation 
declined to participate in a second commitment period, thereby increasing the cost of 
participation for the EU (GLOBE International 2013; IISD 2012). Furthermore, although 
European interests in maintaining the institutional architecture – particularly in the 
realm of market mechanisms – were served by a continuation of the Kyoto Protocol, 
this could also have been achieved through alternative institutional arrangements not 
involving a second commitment period. In fact, as discussed above, the original EU 
position advocated retaining the “essential elements” of the Protocol in a different 
institutional form. Rather, the argumentative strategy employed by negotiators from 
China, India and other developing countries was at least partly responsible for the EU 
change of position.
This episode shows not only that external perceptions of the EU as a climate leader are not 
necessarily a useful indicator of EU influence, but furthermore that external perceptions 
of “leadership” can in fact be used rhetorically as a constraint on EU influence. Of 
course, this is not simply a story of the power of words and framing—it helped that the 
words were spoken by negotiators representing materially powerful states that matter 
a great deal to the future of the climate change regime. Furthermore, China and India 
certainly did not act alone in this process, but were nonetheless vocal and influential 
actors among the larger group of developing countries which were supported by many 
civil society organizations, including those from Europe. 
5. Conclusion
The recent turn to focus on external perceptions in the literature on the EU as a global 
actor is to be welcomed. This research provides us with new insights and is helpful in 
de-centring the study of EU external relations. One—albeit not the only—aim of this 
research is to tell us something about the external influence of the EU. However, while 
perceptions of the EU by other actors can enable and constrain the ability of the EU to 
exert influence beyond its borders, the relationship between external perceptions and 
external influence is complex. Positive perceptions are a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for EU influence beyond its borders. This paper has sought to shed light on 
this topic by examining the seemingly puzzling case of the EU as an environmental 
actor: While the literature broadly reports positive external perceptions of the EU in 
this field, the EU has often failed to achieve its preferred outcomes with respect to 
international climate change negotiations. 
Focusing on China and India, this paper argued that “leadership” in the climate regime 
means very different things to the EU on the one hand, and China and India on the 
other. For the EU it means ambitious targets and policies, which will be followed by 
other actors. For China and India, it means the EU and other industrialized countries 
will take action to reduce their emissions as a matter of historical responsibility, with no 
corresponding obligations for developing countries—at least in the short to medium 
term. 
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Furthermore, the current paper showed how China, India and other developing 
countries were able to use European claims to leadership as a way of constraining the 
EU’s negotiating position, by accusing the EU of trying to “kill” the Protocol and thereby 
abdicating its leadership position. Indeed, this case illustrates that precisely the opposite 
relationship can exist between external perceptions and external influence: far from 
securing the “followership” of other significant actors, the EU’s rhetoric of “leadership” 
with respect to international climate change policy in fact provided a rhetorical means 
by which other countries could resist attempts by the EU to secure their participation 
through new commitments. 
This working paper does not seek to draw broad, generalisable conclusions from one 
case, particularly since China and India are hardly representative of the universe of states 
with which the EU interacts in world politics. Moreover, the field of environmental 
governance and particularly the characteristics of leadership and followership make 
extrapolating from this specific case difficult. However, the argument developed above 
calls attention to the need for further conceptual and empirical research to examine the 
relationship between external perceptions and external influence. This could involve 
further case study analysis examining the extent to which positive or negative external 
perceptions of the EU correlate with successful instances of EU external influence, and 
how and why the outcomes vary across cases. By doing so, we will be able to develop a 
richer understanding of the limitations but also the potential of the growing research on 
external perceptions of the EU.
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